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NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF PREEMPTION
Today humanity holds in its hand the opportunity to further freedom's triumph over all these foes. The United States welcomes our responsibility to lead in this great mission... America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed… in the new world we have entered the only path to peace and security is the path of action.
-George W. Bush, in the National Security Strategy, Sep 2002
STRATEGY OF PREEMPTION
President Bush has promulgated a new strategy of preemption in his Administration's first National Security Strategy (NSS). Preemption, defined as the anticipatory use of force in the face of an imminent attack, has long been accepted as legitimate and appropriate under international law. In the new NSS, however, the Administration is broadening the meaning to encompass preventive war as well. At its core, the new strategy calls for the United States to use its unparalleled military strength to defeat the threat posed by terrorists and tyrants. Accordingly, the U.S may use force even without evidence of an imminent attack to ensure that a serious threat to the United States does not gather or grow over time. 1 Although the NSS's commitment to preempting emerging threats makes sense militarily, the strategy fails to clarify the distinction between preemption and preventative war-or to specify when preemptive force should be used. Further, it does not address the inherent risks associated with a preemption strategy.
DEFINITIONS
Preventive attack and preventive war designate proactive measures taken by a threatened nation to eliminate an anticipated threat. The preventive agent minimizes the threat by choosing the time, place and character of an initial attack and thus denies the threatening agent these advantageous choices. Diplomatic or other means of national power should be exhausted before taking preventative action to provide the opportunity for building domestic and international consensus for the preventive action and for legitimizing such action.
Anticipatory self-defense or striking an enemy before that enemy initiates his attack, is defined in four ways. The fundamental discriminators in these definitions are the distinctions between imminent and inevitable threats and attacks and war.
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• Preemptive Attack: An attack or raid initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent.
• Preemptive War: A war initiated on the basis of expectation and/or evidence that an enemy attack is imminent.
• Preventive Attack: An attack or raid initiated on the belief that the threat of an attack, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that delaying such action would involve great risk.
• Preventive War: A war initiated on the belief that armed conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that delaying such action would involve unacceptable risk.
The administration's new policy often merges all four definitions into the term preemption, so it is difficult to distinguish among them. According to the standard dictionary definition, "imminent" is defined as ; "to project…threaten…ready to take place…hanging threateningly over one's head, danger of being over run." However, they could remain in such a threatening posture for long periods of time, as they already have.
To ascertain imminence, it is necessary to determine the enemy's intent. An imminent threat, ready to take place, is closer in time than an inevitable one.
A truly imminent threat can be devastating if no immediate action is taken to deny it. Resolution, the following qualify as acts of aggression:
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USE OF FORCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
• the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation or annexation;
• bombardment or use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;
• the blockade of ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State;
• an attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces of another State;
• use of armed forces of a State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State in contravention of the agreement;
• action of a State allowing its territory to be used by (an)other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third state;
• the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.
When a given situation does not fit any of the mentioned categories there is a provision recognizing the Security Council's authority to determine an act of aggression in cases not contemplated in the resolution. Even so, Clara Portela contends a terrorist attack does not fit into any of these categories. Only actions carried out by states are accommodated in the definition. 7 In the war on terrorism, the United States has entered uncharted territory.
HISTORY OF PREEMPTION
Under the regime of customary international law that developed long before the UN Charter was adopted, it was generally accepted that preemptive force was permissible in selfdefense. The historical case that gave rise to anticipatory self-defense doctrine is the Caroline incident. During the first part of the nineteenth century, an anti-British insurrection was taking place in Canada. At the time, Canada was under British rule while the United States and Great
Britain were in a state of peace. The Caroline, a ship owned by U.S. nationals, was allegedly providing assistance to the rebels in Canada. On the night of December 29, 1837, while the ship was docked on the U.S. side of the Niagara River, British troops crossed the river, boarded the ship, killed several U.S. nationals, set the ship on fire, and sent the vessel over Niagara Falls.
The British claimed that they were acting in self-defense. Secretary of State Daniel Webster denounced the incident and the British government ultimately apologized. According to Arend, during diplomatic communications between the Americans and the British, necessity and proportionality were two criteria noted as necessary when considering permissible self-defense including preemptive self-defense. Americans and U.S. interests abroad and at home to wear down American resolve. Al Qaeda's strategy seeks to make a war-weary public force the U.S. government to change its policy from confrontation and pre-emption to appeasement.
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CONCEPT OF PREEMPTION STRATEGY
Destroying their settlements, spreading alarms, showing and keeping up a spirit of enterprise that will oblige them to defend their extensive possessions at all points is of infinitely more consequence to the United States of America than all plunder that can be taken -Robert Morris, Letter to John Paul Jones, 1 February 1777
In President Bush's cover letter to the September 2002 National Security Strategy, he describes the most serious threats facing the United States and specifies the means that will be used to address them. Notably, he declares, as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against emerging threats before they are fully formed. It is clear from the cover letter and the text of the NSS that preemption is an important element of the Administration's overall strategy in the post-9/11 environment. However, the concept is not constrained by the traditional definition of preemption, which calls for striking an enemy as it prepares an attack.
Instead the Bush strategy includes prevention, striking an enemy before it is yet in a position to itself attack. This preventive strategy is principally directed at terrorist groups, or at extremist or "rogue" nation states. These two threats are linked, according to the NSS, by a combination of contemporary "radicalism and technology." 17 In effect they pose a new kind or order of threat.
The Administration asserts that the prevalent Cold War strategy of deterrence is unlikely to succeed against rogue states and terrorists. The administration claims that these new enemies are not risk-averse: They view weapons of mass destruction, not as weapons of last resort, but as weapons of choice. The Administration thus argues that the classic doctrine of preemption must be broadened to deal effectively with these new threats.
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The President has also asserted that for centuries international law has recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves: The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction --and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. He further declares that the U.S. must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. He then expands the concept of preemption to actually include preventative war, which justifies a military response "even in the absence of specific evidence of a coming attack." 19 Although the current strategy continues to refer to strategic deterrence, it does not clarify the difference between preemption and preventative war.
PREEMPTION VERSUS DETERRENCE
The current Bush strategy states that the US must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge. We must maintain the capability to deter threats against U.S. interests, allies, and friends. This seems to actually broaden the role of deterrence in U.S. national security policy. In contrast, the strategy envisions a much narrower role for preemption. It discusses preemption in the specific context of defeating terrorists and rogue states . It never suggests preemption has a role to play with respect to a rising China or any residual threat posed by Russia. Nor is the argument for preempting terrorists controversial . Instead, the debate in the United States has always been about whether the U.S. government is doing enough to stop terrorists preemptively, not whether it has to wait for them to attack before acting. But the strategy's argument for preempting rogue states is more debatable. It rests on the disputed claim that deterrence based upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states, who are more willing to take risks. Ivo Daalder maintains that this conclusion is based more on conjecture than hard evidence. He cites that North Korea, the remaining rogue state that the strategy mentions by name, and Iran, although not mentioned as a rogue state but designated the third member of the "axis of evil," have both responded to deterrence. 20 The NSS provides no guidance about when to preempt or the circumstances that justify preemption. Potential targets include a small number of rogue states, and the United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats. President Bush has said that neither North Korea nor Iran currently is a candidate for U.S.-initiated uses of force. But the circumstances that justify preemption raise another and more likely danger: other countries will employ the preemption rationale as a cover for settling their own national security scores, as Russia has already hinted at with Georgia. Henry Kissinger warns, It cannot be in either the American national interest or the world's interest to develop principles that grant every nation an unfettered right of preemption against its own definition of threats to its security. So this new preemptive strategy could legitimize action that others might emulate and thereby reduce US leverage to convince such countries not to use force. It also undervalues the role of deterrence and increases the likelihood that other countries will use the preemption argument to justify their own national security interests. 21 All in all, the new preemptive strategy widens the scope for the use of force.
ADVANTAGES OF A PREEMPTION STRATEGY
The advantages the U. S. use of military force preemptively to counter the threats posed by hostile nations and groups include;
• The threats posed by terrorist groups with global reach and rogue states armed with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons are so immediate and potentially destructive that we cannot wait to absorb a first strike before reacting with armed force. A strategy of preemption responds to emerging threats posed to America and American interests by terrorist networks and hostile states and minimizes the likelihood of an attack.
• A preemptive strategy takes advantage of America's unrivaled military power and allows us to protect our national security in a manner and at a time of our own choosing. We should not have to absorb a devastating attack before we strike back.
• The American people have invested heavily in a military capability second to none so that America's service men and women have all the means necessary to defend us against our enemies. We should not hesitate to use this force to strike first if we feel we are threatened.
• This proactive policy will be welcomed by allied nations, even if some may complain publicly about U.S. unilateralism, because the world relies on American power to deal with these threats, whether from terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda or tyrants as was the case with Saddam Hussein, who threaten entire regions.
• The United States should not be expected to relinquish to another body or nation our sovereign right to use military power to protect our national security interests. As was shown in the late stages of the Iraq debate, we cannot count on the U.N. Security
Council to address imminent threats effectively. Too many different interests are at work in the Security Council for it to mobilize rapid response in crises or reliably in advance of them.
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RISKS
Consider the following categorical risks inherent in the new strategy of preemption:
• The preemptive doctrine invites international chaos. America's peace and security have been well served by the U.N. Charter's provision limiting use of force against other nations to self-defense against an armed attack. If the U.S. revives the dangerous doctrine of preemptive war, any nation could then invoke invented threats to justify aggressive wars, making the world far more unstable and unsafe.
• Strategies of preemption can backfire by actually encouraging arms proliferation and creating incentives for nations at odds with the U.S. to seek nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons in order to deter a potential American attack. The resulting ripple of proliferation could heighten world instability.
• A stand-alone U.S. preemption strategy, necessarily relying on intelligence estimates that inevitably include some measure of uncertainty, can put the U.S. in the vulnerable position of bearing all of the costs of preemptive military actions-and potentially being left alone when things go wrong. If the international community disagrees with a U.S. decision to use force preemptively, other nations will likely be reluctant to provide support-military, diplomatic, peacekeeping, financial, intelligence-when we need it. 23 The current NSS fails to acknowledge that a preemptive attack could precipitate the very attacks it seeks to prevent. One danger is the possibility that a rogue state will use its weapons of mass destruction before it loses them-or deliberately gives them to groups that will. A less obvious danger is that terrorists will be able to use the chaos that accompanies war to buy or steal weapons of mass destruction. 24 Until the Administration can distinguish justifiable preemption from unlawful aggression in a way that gains widespread adherence from our partners and friends, it risks seeing its words used to justify ends it opposes. Historically, America's leaders rejected using preemptive attacks against major powers like Russia and China in the 1950s and '60s, relying successfully instead on deterrence and containment. Deterrence and containment are more effective against today's threats from small, weak countries rather than preemptive war . 
POLICY OPTIONS
CONCLUSION
It is clear from the cover letter and the text of the NSS that preemption is an important element of the administration's approach to the overall strategy in the post-September 11 environment. The strategy fails to clarify the distinction between preemption and preventative war or specify when preemptive force should be used. Further, it does not address the inherent risks associated with a preemption strategy.
The administration asserts that deterrence, which prevailed during the Cold War, is unlikely to work with respect to rogue states and terrorists. It argues that in view of the threats posed by terrorist groups with global reach and by rouge states armed with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, we cannot wait to absorb a first strike before reacting. The doctrine of preemption must be used to deal with these new threats. However, the administration must distinguish justifiable preemption from unlawful aggression in a way that gains widespread adherence among our partners and friends.
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